This day, which was originally called International Working
Women’s Day is a day whose theme ranges
from country to country and year to year.
The Status of Women Canada’s website describes this year’s theme to be
to celebrate “women's roles in the
economic prosperity of rural, remote and Northern regions.” If you look at the
website there are a number of interesting facts regarding the work of women in
these communities.
In my employment law class today we will be discussing one
of Canada’s most important decisions regarding women, the Meiorin, case. This is the case of Tawney Meiorin,
firefighter, member of the initial attack crew of the wildland forest fire
fighting team in the Golden forest district of British Columbia. When the BC
government instituted new fitness standards, Meiorin was unable to meet one of
the requirements – running 2.5 k in 11 minutes. She did 11:40. The run has nothing
to do with outrunning fires – just a way to test aerobic fitness. The basis of the case was the fact that this
standard could be met by 70% of men on their first try but only by 35% of
women. Moreover, even after training women
had a more difficult time than men of attaining the standard. The Supreme Court
of Canada took the opportunity to set new tests for how employers may implement
workplace standards. Only where it is
not possible to accommodate, can the standard
remain; if accommodation is possible, then the standard must be replaced with
something that reflects genuine inclusiveness.
One of the other important cases I always address in class
in the famous Person’s case. In that
case, though not related to employment per se but rather to the office of
Senator of Canada. Emily Murphy had been appointed a police magistrate in
Alberta in 1916 but was initially challenged on the basis that only person’s
could become magistrates. The Alberta court held that women were indeed
persons. When Murphy later let her name stand for an appointment to the Senate
of Canada she was rejected all the way through to the Supreme Court of Canada
on the grounds that only “persons” could be appointed to the Senate. On appeal
to the Privy Council (division of the House of Lords in England which used to
be our final appeal option) Lord Sankey
held: "yes, women are persons ...
and eligible to be summoned and may become Members of the Senate of Canada.. .
. The exclusion of women from all public
offices is a relic of days more barbarous than ours. And to those who would ask
why the word "persons" should include females, the obvious answer is,
why should it not?"
Prior to the Emily Murphy case, Clara Brett Martin, fought to be admitted to
the law profession and was initially denied on the reasons that she was not a
person. In 1897 Martin became the first
woman to practice law in Canada and the entire British Empire. To do this she overcame opposition to women
lawyers on grounds that feminine attributes could unduly sway judges and
juries. She lobbied to overturn
regulations that barred women lawyers because only “persons” could be admitted. As I have noted in earlier posts, more than
half the admissions to law schools today are women. Yet it was just over 100
years ago when the Chief Justice of Wisconsin, Edward J Ryan held in the case
of Lavinia Goodell:
We find no statutory authority for the admission of
females to the bar of any court of this state. And, with all the respect and
sympathy for this lady which all men owe to all good women, we cannot regret
that we do not.
We cannot but think the common law wise in excluding
women from the profession of the law. The profession enters largely into the
well being of society; and, to be honorably filled and safely to society,
exacts the devotion of life.
The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex
for the bearing and nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of
the homes of the world and their maintenance in love and honor. And all
life-long callings of women, inconsistent with these radical and sacred duties
of their sex, as is the profession of the law, are departures from the order of
nature; and when voluntary, treason against it.
The cruel chances of life sometimes baffle both sexes,
and may leave women free from the peculiar duties of their sex. These may need
employment, and should be welcome to any not derogatory to their sex and its
proprieties, or inconsistent with the good order of society.
But it is public policy to provide for the sex, not for
its superfluous members; and not to tempt women from the proper duties of their
sex by opening to them duties peculiar to ours.
There are many employments in life not unfit for female
character. The profession of the law is surely not one of these. The peculiar
qualities of womanhood, its gentle graces, its quick sensibility, its tender
susceptibility, its purity, its delicacy, its emotional impulses, its
subordination of hard reason to sympathetic feeling, are surely not
qualifications for forensic strife.
Nature has tempered woman as little for the juridical
conflicts of the court room, as for the physical conflicts of the battle field.
Womanhood is moulded for gentler and better things. And
it is not the saints of the world who chiefly give employment to our
profession. It has essentially and habitually to do with all that is selfish
and malicious, knavish and criminal, coarse and brutal, repulsive and obscene,
in human life. It would be revolting to all female sense of the innocence and
sanctity of their sex, shocking to man's reverence for womanhood and faith in
woman, on which hinge all the better affections and humanities of life, that
woman should be permitted to mix professionally in all the nastiness of the
world which finds its way into courts of justice; all the unclean issues, all
the collateral questions of sodomy, incest, rape, seduction, fornication,
adultery, pregnancy, bastardy, legitimacy, prostitution, lascivious
cohabitation, abortion, infanticide, obscene publications, libel and slander of
sex, impotence, divorce: all the nameless catalogue of indecencies, la
chronique scandaleuse of all the vices and all the infirmities of all
society, with which the profession has to deal, and which go towards filling
judicial reports which must be read for accurate knowledge of the law.
This is bad enough for men. We hold in too high
reverence the sex without which, as is truly and beautifully written, le
commencement de la vie est sans secours, le milieu sans plaisir, et le fin sans
consolation, voluntarily to commit it to such studies and such occupations.
Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis (not such aid
nor such defenders does the time require), should juridical contests be upheld.
Reverence for all womanhood would suffer in the public
spectacle of woman so instructed and so engaged. This motion gives appropriate
evidence of this truth. No modest woman could read without pain and self
abasement, no woman could so overcome the instincts of sex as publicly to
discuss, the case which we had occasion to cite supra, King v. Wiseman.
And when counsel was arguing for this lady that the word person
necessarily includes females, her presence made it impossible to suggest to him
as reductio ad absurdum (disproof of a proposition by showing that it
leads to absurd or untenable conclusions) of his position, that the same
construction of the same word would subject woman to prosecution for the
paternity of a bastard, and to prosecution for rape.
Discussions are habitually necessary in courts of
justice, which are unfit for female ears. The habitual presence of women at
these would tend to relax the public sense of decency and propriety.
If, as counsel threatened, these things are to come, we
will take no voluntary part in bringing them about.
Take a look at my post from January 23rd below
called Boys Night Out Part II to get a more current look at women in the
profession.
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